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Abstract
We study combinatorial auctions with interdependent valuations. In such settings, each
agent i has a private signal si that captures her private information, and the valuation function
of every agent depends on the entire signal profile, s = (s1, . . . , sn). The literature in economics
shows that the interdependent model gives rise to strong impossibility results, and identifies
assumptions under which optimal solutions can be attained. The computer science literature
provides approximation results for simple single-parameter settings (mostly single item auctions,
or matroid feasibility constraints). Both bodies of literature focus largely on valuations satisfying
a technical condition termed single crossing (or variants thereof).
We consider the class of submodular over signals (SOS) valuations (without imposing any
single-crossing type assumption), and provide the first welfare approximation guarantees for
multi-dimensional combinatorial auctions, achieved by universally ex-post IC-IR mechanisms.
Our main results are: (i) 4-approximation for any single-parameter downward-closed setting
with single-dimensional signals and SOS valuations; (ii) 4-approximation for any combinatorial
auction with multi-dimensional signals and separable-SOS valuations; and (iii) (k + 3)- and
(2 log(k)+4)-approximation for any combinatorial auction with single-dimensional signals, with
k-sized signal space, for SOS and strong-SOS valuations, respectively. All of our results extend
to a parameterized version of SOS, d-SOS, while losing a factor that depends on d.
1 Introduction
Maximizing social welfare with private valuations is a solved problem. The classical Vickrey-
Clarke-Grove (VCG) family of mechanisms [Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973], of which
the Vickrey second-price auction is a special case, are dominant strategy incentive-compatible and
guarantee optimal social welfare in general social choice settings.
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In this paper, we consider combinatorial auctions, where each agent has a value for every subset
of items, and the goal is to maximize the social welfare, namely the sum of agent valuations for
their assigned bundles. As a special case of general social choice settings, the VCG mechanism
solves this problem optimally, as long as the values are independent.
There are many settings, however, in which the independence of values is not realistic. If the
item being sold has money-making potential or is likely to be resold, the values different agents
have may be correlated, or perhaps even common. A classic example is an auction for the right to
drill for oil in a certain location [Wilson, 1969]. Importantly, in such settings, agents may have
different information about what that value actually is. For example, the value of an oil lease
depends on how much oil there actually is, and the different agents may have access to different
assessments about this. Consequently, an agent might change her own estimate of the value of the
oil lease given access to the information another agent has. Similarly, if an agent had access to the
results of a house inspection performed by a different agent, that might change her own estimate
of the value of a house that is for sale.
The following model due to Milgrom and Weber [1982], described here for single-item auctions,
has become standard for auction design in such settings. These are known as interdependent value
settings (IDV) 1 and are defined as follows:
• Each agent i has a real-valued, private signal si. The set of signals s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) may
be drawn from a (possibly) correlated distribution.
The signals summarize the information available to the agents about the item. For example,
when the item to be sold is a house, the signal could capture the results of an inspection and
privately collected information about the school district. In the setting of oil drilling rights,
the signals could be information that each companies’ engineers have about the site based on
geologic surveys, etc.
• The value of the item to agent i is a function vi(s) of the signals (or information) of all agents.
A typical example is when vi(s) = si + β
∑
j 6=i sj , for some β ≤ 1. This type of valuation
function captures settings where an agent’s value depends both on how much he likes the
item (si) and on the resale value which is naturally estimated in terms of how much other
agents like the item (
∑
j 6=i sj) [Myerson, 1981].
In the economics literature, interdependent settings have been studied for about 50 years (with
far too many papers to list; for an overview, see [Krishna, 2009]). Within the theoretical com-
puter science community, interdependent (and correlated) settings have received less attention (see
Section 1.4 for further discussion and references).
1.1 Maximizing Social Welfare
Consider the goal of maximizing social welfare in interdependent settings. Here, a direct revelation
mechanism consists of each agent i reporting a bid for their private signal si, and the auctioneer
determining the allocation and payments. (It is assumed that the auctioneer knows the form of the
valuation functions vi(·).)
1 See also [Krishna, 2009; Milgrom, 2004].
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In interdependent settings, it is not possible2 to design dominant-strategy incentive-compatible
auctions, since an agent’s value depends on all of the signals, so if, say, agent i misreports his
signal, then agent j might win at a price above her value if she reports truthfully. The next
strongest equilibrium notion one could hope for is to maximize efficiency in ex-post equilibrium:
bidding truthfully is an ex-post equilibrium if an agent does not regret having bid truthfully, given
that other agents bid truthfully. In other words, bidding truthfully is a Nash equilibrium for
every signal profile.3 A strong impossibility result due to Jehiel and Moldovanu [2001] shows that
with multi-dimensional signals, maximizing welfare is generically impossible even in Bayes-Nash
equilibrium.4
For single-item auctions with single-dimensional signals, a characterization of ex-post incentive
compatibility in the IDV setting is known, analogous to Myerson’s characterization for the inde-
pendent private values model (e.g., Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen [2016]). The characterization
says that there are payments that yield an ex-post incentive-compatible mechanism if and only if
the corresponding allocation rule is monotone in each agent’s signal, when all other signals are held
fixed. Maximizing efficiency in ex-post equilibrium is also provably impossible unless the valuation
functions vi(s) satisfy a technical condition known as the single-crossing condition [Milgrom and
Weber, 1982; d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet, 1982; Maskin, 1992; Ausubel, 1999; Dasgupta and
Maskin, 2000; Athey, 2001; Bergemann, Shi, and Va¨lima¨ki, 2009; Chawla, Fu, and Karlin, 2014;
Che, Kim, and Kojima, 2015; Li, 2016; Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2016]. I.e., the influence
of agent i’s signal on his own value is at least as high as its influence on other agents’ values, when
all other signals s−i are held fixed 5. When the single-crossing condition holds, there is a general-
ization of VCG that maximizes efficiency in ex-post equilibrium. (See [Cre´mer and McLean, 1985,
1988; Krishna, 2009].)
Unfortunately, the single crossing condition does not generally suffice to obtain optimal so-
cial welfare in settings beyond that of a single item auction with single-dimensional signals. It is
insufficient in fairly simple settings, such as two-item, two-bidder auctions with unit-demand val-
uations (see Section A), or single-parameter settings with downward-closed feasibility constraints
(see Section B).
Moreover, there are many relevant single-item settings where the single-crossing condition does
not hold. For example, suppose that the signals indicate demand for a product being auctioned,
agents represent firms, and one firm has a stronger signal about demand, but is in a weaker position
to take advantage of that demand. A setting like this could yield valuations that do not satisfy the
single crossing condition. For a concrete example, consider the following scenario given by [Maskin,
1992] and [Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000].
Example 1.1. Suppose that oil can be sold in the market at a price of 4 dollars per unit and
two firms are competing for the right to drill for oil. Firm 1 has a fixed cost of 1 to produce
oil and a marginal cost of 2 for each additional unit produced, whereas firm 2 has a fixed cost
of 2 and a marginal cost of 1 for each additional unit produced. In addition, suppose that firm
2 Except perhaps in degenerate situations.
3 Note that, of course, every ex-post equilibrium is a Bayes-Nash incentive compatible equilibrium, but not
necessarily vice versa, and therefore ex-post equilibria are much more robust: they do not depend on knowledge of
the priors and bidders need not think about how other bidders might be bidding. This increases our confidence that
an ex-post equilibrium is likely to be reached.
4For more details on this and other related work, see Section 1.4.
5This implies that given signals s−i, if agent i has the highest value when si = s∗, then agent i continues to have
the highest value for si > s
∗. This is precisely the monotonicity needed for ex-post incentive compatibility.
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1 does a private test and discovers that the expected size of the oil reserve is s1 units. Then
v1(s1, s2) = (4− 2)s1 − 1 = 2s1 − 1, whereas v2(s1, s2) = (4− 1)s1 − 2 = 3s1 − 2. These valuations
don’t satisfy the single-crossing condition since firm 1 needs to win when s1 is low and lose when
s1 is high.
1.2 Research Problems
This paper addresses the following two issues related to social welfare maximization in the inter-
dependent values model:
1. To what extent can the optimal social welfare be approximated in interdependent settings
that do not satisfy the single-crossing condition?
2. How far beyond the single item, single-dimensional setting can we go?
Given the impossibility result of Jehiel and Moldovanu [2001], we ask if it is possible to
approximately maximize social welfare in combinatorial auctions with interdependent values?
The first question was recently considered by Eden, Feldman, Fiat, and Goldner [2018] who gave
two examples pointing out the difficulty of approximating social welfare without single crossing.
Example 1.2 shows that even with two bidders and one signal, there are valuation functions for
which no deterministic auction can achieve any bounded approximation ratio to optimal social
welfare.
Example 1.2 (No bound for deterministic auctions Eden et al. [2018]). A single item is for sale.
There are two players, A and B, only A has a signal sA ∈ {0, 1}. The valuations are
vA(0) = 1 vB(0) = 0
vA(1) = 2 vB(1) = H,
where H is an arbitrary large number. If A doesn’t win when sA = 0, then the approximation ratio
is infinite. On the other hand, if A does win when sA = 0, then by monotonicity, A must also win
at sA = 1, yielding a 2/H fraction of the optimal social welfare.
The next example can be used to show that there are valuation functions for which no random-
ized auction performs better (in the worst case) than allocating to a random bidder (i.e., a factor
n approximation to social welfare), even if a prior over the signals is known.
Example 1.3 (n lower bound for randomized auctions Eden et al. [2018]). There are n bidders
1, . . . , n that compete over a single item. For every agent i, si ∈ {0, 1}, and
vi(s) =
∏
j 6=i
sj +  · si for → 0;
that is, agent i’s value is high if and only if all other agents’ signals are high simultaneously. When
all signals are 1, then in any feasible allocation, there must be an agent i which is allocated with
probability of at most 1/n. By monotonicity, this means that the probability this agent is allocated
when the signal profile is s′ = (1−i, 0i) is at most 1/n as well. Therefore, the achieved welfare at
signal profile s′ is at most 1/n+ (n− 1) · , while the optimal welfare is 1, giving a factor n gap 6.
6 Eden et al. [2018] show that there exists a prior for which the n gap still holds, even if the mechanism knows
the prior.
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Therefore, some assumption is needed if we are to get good approximations to social welfare.
The approach taken by Eden et al. [2018] was to define a relaxed notion of single-crossing that they
called c-single crossing and then provide mechanisms that approximately maximize social welfare,
where the approximation ratio depends on c and n, the number of agents.
In this paper, we go in a different direction, starting with the observation that in Example 1.3,
the valuations treat the signals as highly-complementary–one has a value bounded away from zero
only if all other agent’s signals are high simultaneously. This suggests that the case where the
valuations treat the signals more like “substitutes” might be easier to handle.
We capture this by focusing on submodular over signals (SOS) valuations. This means that for
every i and j, when signals s−j are lower, the sensitivity of the valuation vi(s) to changes in sj is
higher. Formally, we assume that for all j, for any sj , δ ≥ 0, and for any s−j and s′−j such that
component-wise s−j ≤ s′−j , it holds that
vi(sj + δ, s−j)− vi(sj , s−j) ≥ vi(sj + δ, s′−j)− vi(sj , s′−j).
Many valuations considered in the literature on interdependent valuations are SOS (though this
term is not used) Milgrom and Weber [1982]; Dasgupta and Maskin [2000]; Klemperer [1998]. The
simplest (yet still rich) class of SOS valuations are fully separable valuation functions 7, where there
are arbitrary (weakly increasing) functions gij(sj) for each pair of bidders i and j such that
vi(s) =
n∑
j=1
gij(sj).
A more general class of SOS valuation functions are functions of the form vi(s) = f(
∑n
j=1 gij(sj)),
where f is a weakly increasing concave function.
We can now state the main question we study in this paper: to what extent can social welfare
be approximated in interdependent settings with SOS valuations? Unfortunately, Example 1.2 itself
describes SOS valuations, so no deterministic auction can achieve any bounded approximation ratio,
even for this subclass of valuations. Thus, we must turn to randomized auctions.
1.3 Our Results and Techniques
All of our positive results concern the design of randomized, prior-free, universally ex-post incentive-
compatible (IC), individually rational (IR) mechanisms. Prior-free means that the rules of the
mechanism makes no use of the prior distribution over the signals, thus need not have any knowledge
of the prior.
Our first result provides approximation guarantees for single-parameter downward-closed set-
tings. An important special case of this result is single-item auctions, which was the focus of Eden
et al. [2018].
Theorem 4.1 (See Section 4): For every single-parameter downward-closed setting, if the valuation
functions are SOS, then the Random Sampling Vickrey auction is a universally ex-post IC-IR
mechanism that gives a 4-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
7 This type of valuation function is ubiquitous in the economics literature on inderdependent settings; often with
the function simply assumed to be a linear function of the signals (see, e.g., Jehiel and Moldovanu [2001]; Klemperer
[1998]).
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Interestingly, no deterministic mechanism can give better than an (n − 1)-approximation for
arbitrary downward-closed settings, even if the valuations are single crossing, and this is tight.
Recall that for a single item auction, or even multiple identical items, with single crossing valuations,
the deterministic generalized Vickrey auction obtains the optimal welfare Maskin [1992]; Ausubel
[1999].
We then turn to multi-dimensional settings. In the most general combinatorial auction model
that we consider, each agent i has a signal siT for each subset T of items, and a valuation function
viT := viT (s1T , s2T , . . . , snT ). For this setting, it is not at all clear under what conditions it might
be possible to maximize social welfare in ex-post equilibrium.8
However, rather surprisingly (see the related work section below), for the case of separable SOS
valuations9, we are able to extend the 4-approximation guarantee to combinatorial auctions.
Theorem 5.1 (See Section 5): For every combinatorial auction, if the valuation functions are
separable-SOS, then the Random Sampling VCG auction is a universally ex-post IC-IR mechanism
that gives a 4-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
Finally, we consider combinatorial auctions where each agent i has a single-dimensional signal
si, but where the valuation function viT for each subset of items T is an arbitrary SOS valuation
function viT (s1, . . . , sn). For this case, we show the following:
Theorems 6.1 and 6.5 (See Sections 6.1 and 6.2): Consider combinatorial auctions with single-
dimensional signals, where each signal takes one of k possible values. If the valuation functions are
SOS, then there exists a universally ex-post IC-IR mechanism that gives a (k+3)-approximation to
the optimal social welfare. If the valuations are strong-SOS 10, the approximation ratio improves
to O(log k).
All of the above results, as well as our lower bounds, are summarized in Table 1. In addition, all
of the results in this paper generalize easily, with a corresponding degradation in the approximation
ratio, to the weaker requirement of d-SOS valuations 11.
1.3.1 Intuition for results
The fundamental tension in settings with interdependent valuations that is not present in the
private values setting is the following. Consider, for example, a single item auction setting where
agent 1’s truthful report of her signal increases agent 2’s value. Since, this increases the chance that
agent 2 wins and may decrease agent 1’s chance of winning, it might motivate agent 1 to strategize
and misreport.
Our approach is to simply prevent this interaction. Without looking at the signals, our mecha-
8 See the related work and also Lemmas A.2 and A.3, which show that under one natural generalization of single-
crossing to the setting of two items and two agents that are unit demand, single crossing is not sufficient for full
efficiency.
9 A valuation is separable-SOS if the valuation for an agent can be split into two parts, an SOS function of all
other signals and an arbitrary function of the agents’ own signal. Such valuations generalize the fully separable case
discussed above. See definition 2.16
10See definition 2.14.
11 A valuation function is d-SOS if for all j, for all δ > 0, and for any s−j and s′−j such that component-wise
s−j ≤ s′−j , it holds that d · (vi(sj + δ, s−j)− vi(sj , s−j)) ≥ vi(sj + δ, s′−j)− vi(sj , s′−j).
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nism randomly divides the agents into two sets12: potential winners and certain losers. Losers never
receive any allocation. When estimating the value of a potentially winning agent i, we use only
the signals of losers and i’s own signal(s). Thus, potential winners can not impact the estimated
values and hence allocations of other potential winners. This resolves the truthfulness issue. The
remaining question is: can we get sufficiently accurate estimates of the agents’ values when we
ignore so many signals?
The key lemma (Lemma 3.1 Section 3) shows that we can do so, when the valuations are SOS.
Specifically, for any agent i, if all agents other than i are split into two random sets A (losers) and
B (potential winners), and the signals of agents in the random subset B are “zeroed out”, then the
expected value agent i has for the item is at least half of her true valuation. That is,
EA[vi(si, sA,0B)] ≥ 1
2
vi(s).
Dealing with combinatorial settings is more involved as the truthfullness characterization is less
obvious, but the key ideas of random partitioning and using the signals of certain losers remain at
the core of our results.
1.3.2 Additional remarks
While this paper deals entirely with welfare maximization, our results have significance for the
objective of maximizing the seller’s revenue. Eden et al. [2018] give a reduction from revenue max-
imization to welfare maximization in single-item auctions with SOS valuations. Thus, the constant
factor approximation mechanism presented in this paper implies a constant factor approximation
to the optimal revenue in single-item auctions with SOS valuations. We note that this is the first
revenue approximation result that does not assume any single-crossing type assumption ([Chawla
et al., 2014; Eden et al., 2018; Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2016; Li, 2016] require single
crossing or approximate single crossing).
Finally, one can easily verify that, based on Yao’s min-max theorem, the existence of a random-
ized prior-free mechanism that gives some approximation guarantee (in expectation over the coin
flips of the mechanism) implies the existence of a deterministic prior-dependent mechanisms that
gives the same approximation guarantee (in expectation over the signal profiles).
1.4 More on Related Work
As discussed above, in single-parameter settings, there is an extensive literature on mechanism
design with interdependent valuations that considers social welfare maximization, revenue maxi-
mization and other objectives. However, the vast majority of this literature assumes some kind of
single-crossing condition and, in the context of social welfare, focuses on exact optimization.
There are two papers that we are aware of that study the question of how well optimal so-
cial welfare can be approximated in ex-post equilibrium without single-crossing. The first is the
aforementioned paper [Eden et al., 2018] on single item auctions with interdependent valuations.
They defined a parameterized version of single-crossing, termed c-single crossing, where c > 1 is a
parameter that indicates how close is the valuation profile to satisfy single-crossing. For c-single
crossing valuations, they provide a number of results including a lower bound of c on the approxi-
mation ratio achievable by any mechanism, a matching upper bound for binary signal spaces, and
12 as in [Goldberg, Hartline, and Wright, 2001].
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Setting Approximation Guarantees
Single Parameter SOS valuations
Downward Closed Feasibility
Single-Dimensional Signals
≥ 1/4
∀mech. ≤ 1/2 (Section 4)
Arbitrary Combinatorial SOS valuations
Single-Dimensional Signals, k-sized Signal Space
≥ 1/(k + 3)
∀mech. ≤ 1/2 (Section 6.1)
Arbitrary Combinatorial, Strong-SOS Valuations
Single-Dimensional Signals, k-sized Signal Space
≥ 1/(log(k) + 2)
∀mech. ≤ 1/2 (Section 6.2)
Combinatorial, Separable-SOS Valuations
Multi-Dimensional Signals
≥ 1/4
∀mech. ≤ 1/2 (Section 5)
Table 1: The table shows the approximation factors achievable for social welfare maximization
with SOS and strong-SOS valuations. Similar results hold for d-approximate SOS/Strong-SOS
valuations, while losing a factor that depends on d. All positive results are obtained with universally
ex-post IC-IR randomized mechanisms.
mechanisms that achieve approximation ratios of (n − 1)c and 2c3/2√n (the first is deterministic
and the second is randomized).
Ito and Parkes [2006] also consider approximating social welfare in the interdependent setting.
Specifically, they propose a greedy contingent-bid auction (a la [Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000]) and
show that it achieves a
√
m approximation to the optimal social welfare for m goods, in the special
case of combinatorial auctions with single-minded bidders.
For multidimensional signals and settings, the landscape is sparser (and bleaker) and, to our
knowledge, focuses on exact social welfare maximization. Maskin [1992] has observed that, in
general, no efficient incentive-compatible single item auction exists if a buyer’s valuation depends
on a multi-dimensional signal.
Jehiel and Moldovanu [2001] consider a very general model in which there is a set K of possible
alternatives, and a multidimensional signal space, where each agent j has a signal sjki for each
outcome k and other agent j. In their model the valuation function of an agent i for outcome k is
linear in the signals, that is, vi(k) :=
∑
j a
j
kis
j
ki. Thus, their valuation functions are, in one sense,
a special case of our separable valuation functions. On the other hand, they are more general in
that all quantities depend on the outcome k. Thus, there are allocation externalities. Their main
result is that, generically, there is no Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanism that maximizes
social welfare in this setting. However, they do give an ex-post IC mechanism that maximizes social
welfare with both information and allocation externalities if the signals are one-dimensional, the
valuation functions are linear in the signals, and a single-crossing type condition holds.
Jehiel, Meyer-ter Vehn, Moldovanu, and Zame [2006] go on to show that the only deterministic
social choice functions that are ex-post implementable in generic mechanism design frameworks
with multidimensional signals, interdependent valuations and transferable utilities, are constant
functions.
Finally, Bikhchandani [2006] considers a single item setting with multidimensional signals but
no allocation externalities and shows that there is a generalization of single-crossing that allows
some social choice rules to be implemented ex-post.
For further analysis and discussion of implementation with interdependent valuations, see e.g.,
Bergemann and Morris [2005] and McLean and Postlewaite [2015].
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For further literature in computer science on interdependent and correlated values, see [Ro-
nen, 2001; Constantin, Ito, and Parkes, 2007; Constantin and Parkes, 2007; Klein, Moreno, Parkes,
Plakosh, Seuken, and Wallnau, 2008; Papadimitriou and Pierrakos, 2011; Dobzinski, Fu, and Klein-
berg, 2011; Babaioff, Kleinberg, and Paes Leme, 2012; Abraham, Athey, Babaioff, and Grubb, 2011;
Robu, Parkes, Ito, and Jennings, 2013; Kempe, Syrgkanis, and Tardos, 2013; Che et al., 2015; Li,
2016; Chawla et al., 2014].
2 Model and Definitions
2.1 Single Parameter Settings
In Section 4, we will consider single-parameter settings with interdependent valuations and downward-
closed feasibility constraints. In these settings, a mechanism decides which subset of agents 1, . . . , n
are to receive “service” (e.g., an item). The feasibility constraint is defined by a collection I ⊆ 2[n]
of subsets of agents that may feasibly be served simultaneously. We restrict attention to downward-
closed settings, which means that any subset of a feasible set is also feasible. A simple example is
a k-item auction, where I is the collection of all subsets of agents of size at most k.
For these settings, we use the interdependent value model of Milgrom and Weber [1982]:
Definition 2.1 (Single Dimensional Signals, Single Parameter Valuations). Each agent j has a
private signal sj ∈ R+. The value agent j gives to “receiving service” vj(s) ∈ R+, is a function
of all agents’ signals s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn). The function vj(s) is assumed to be weakly increasing in
each coordinate and strictly increasing in si.
2.1.1 Deterministic Mechanisms
Definition 2.2 (Deterministic Single Parameter Mechanisms). A deterministic mechanism M =
(x, p) in the downward closed setting is a mapping from reported signals s = (s1, . . . , sn) to alloca-
tions x(s) = {xi(s)}1≤i≤n and payments p(s) = {pi(s)}1≤i≤n, where xi(s) ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether
or not agent i receives service and pi(s) is the payment of agent i. It is required that the set of
agents that receive service is feasible, i.e., {i | xi(s) = 1} ∈ I. (The mechanism designer knows the
form of the valuation functions but learns the private signals only when they are reported.)
Definition 2.3 (Agent utility). Given a deteministic mechanism (x, p), the utility of agent i when
her true signal is si, she reports s
′
i and the other agents report s−i is
ui(s
′
i, s−i|si) = xi(s′i, s−i)vi(si, s−i)− pi(s′i, s−i).
Agent i will report s′i so as to maximize ui(s
′
i, s−i|si). We use ui(s) to denote the utility when she
reports truthfully, i.e., ui(si, s−i|si).
Definition 2.4 (Deterministic ex-post incentive compatibility (IC)). A deterministic mechanism
M = (x, p) in the interdependent setting is ex-post incentive compatible (IC) if, irrespective of the
true signals, and given that all other agents report their true signals, there is no advantage to an
agent to report any signal other than her true signal. In other words, assuming that s−i are the
true signals of other bidders, ui(s
′
i, s−i|si) is maximized by reporting si truthfully.
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Definition 2.5 (Deterministic ex-post individual rationality (IR)). A deterministic mechanism in
the interdependent setting is ex-post individually rational (IR) if, irrespective of the true signals,
and given that all other agents report their true signals, no agent gets negative utility by participating
in the mechanism.
If a deterministic mechanism is both ex-post IR and ex-post IR we say that it is ex-post IC-IR.
Definition 2.6. A deterministic allocation rule x is monotone if for every agent i, every signal
profile of all other agents s−i, and every si ≤ s′i, it holds that xi(si, s−i) = 1⇒ xi(s′i, s−i) = 1.
Proposition 2.1. [Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2016] For every deterministic allocation rule
x for single parameter valuations, there exist payments p such that the mechanism (x, p) is ex-post
IC-IR if and only if xi is monotone for every agent i.
2.1.2 Randomized Mechanisms
Definition 2.7. A randomized mechanism is a probability distribution over deterministic mecha-
nisms.
Definition 2.8 (Universal ex-post IC-IR). A randomized mechanism is said to be universally ex-
post IC-IR if all deterministic mechanisms in the support are ex-post IC-IR.
2.2 Combinatorial Valuations with Interdependent Signals
Sections 5 and 6 focus on combinatorial auctions, where there are n agents and m items. In these
settings, a mechanism is used to decide how the items are partitioned among the agents. We
consider two models for the interdependent valuations: 13
Definition 2.9 (Single Dimensional Signals, Combinatorial Valuations). Each agent i has a signal
si ∈ R+. The value agent i gives to subset of items T ⊆ [m], which we denote by vjT (s), is a
function of s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn).
Definition 2.10 (Multidimensional Combinatorial Signals, Combinatorial Valuations). Here, each
agent has a signal for each subset of items; for any agent i, we use siT to denote agent i’s signal
for subset of items T ⊆ [m]. The value agent i gives to set T is denoted by viT (sT ) where sT =
(s1T , s2T , . . . , snT ) ∈ R+n. We use s to denote the set of all signals {sT }T⊆2m.
In both cases, each viT (·) is assumed to be a weakly increasing function of each signal and
strictly increasing in si (or siT respectively), and known to the mechanism designer.
We give subsequent definitions only for multidimensional combinatorial signals, as single di-
mensional signals can be viewed as a special case of multi-dimensional signals where siT = si for
all T .
2.2.1 Deterministic Mechanisms
Definition 2.11 (Deterministic mechanisms for combinatorial settings). A deteministic mechanism
M = (x, p) is a mapping from reported signals s to allocations x = {xiT } (where each xiT ∈ {0, 1})
and payments p = {piT } for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and T ⊂ {1, . . . ,m} such that:
13 For other types of signals and interdependent valuation models, see, e.g., Jehiel and Moldovanu [2001].
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• Agent j is allocated the set T iff xjT (s) = 1;
• For each agent j, there is at most one T for which xjT (s) = 1;
• The sets allocated to different agents do not intersect.
• The payment for agent j when her allocation is set T is pjT (s).
Definition 2.12 (Agent Utility). The utility of agent i when her signals are si = {siT }T⊂2m, she
reports s′i and the other agents report s−i is
ui(s
′
i, s−i|si) =
∑
T⊆2m
xiT (s
′
i, s−i)[viT (siT , s−iT )− piT (s′i, s−i)].
Given a mechanism M = (x, p), agent i will report s′i so as to maximize ui(s
′
i, s−i|si). We use ui(s)
to denote the utility when she reports truthfully, i.e., ui(si, s−i|si).
The definitions of ex-post incentive compatibility (IC) and ex-post individually rationality (IR)
for deterministic mechanisms for combinatorial settings are the same as the appropriate definitions
for single parameter mechanisms (Definitions 2.4 and 2.5 with the obvious modifications).
2.2.2 Randomized Mechanisms
As with single parameter mechanisms, a randomized mechanism for a combinatorial setting is a
probability distribution over deterministic mechanisms for the combinatorial setting, and a ran-
domized mechanism is said to be universally ex post IC-IR if all deterministic mechanisms in the
support are themselves ex-post IC-IR.
2.3 Submodularity over signals (SOS)
As discussed in the introduction, our results will rely on an assumption about the valuation functions
that we call submodularity over signals or SOS. The SOS (resp. strong-SOS) notion we use is the
same as the weak diminishing returns (resp. strong diminishing returns) submodularity notion
in [Bian, Levy, Krause, and Buhmann, 2017; Niazadeh, Roughgarden, and Wang, 2018]14. SOS
was also used in [Eden et al., 2018], generalizing a similar notion in [Chawla et al., 2014].
Definition 2.13 (d-approximate submodular-over-signals valuations (d-SOS valuations)). A valu-
ation function v(s) is a d-SOS valuation if for all j, sj, δ ≥ 0,
s−j = (s1, . . . , sj−1, sj+1, . . . , sn) and s′−j = (s
′
1, . . . , s
′
j−1, s
′
j+1, . . . , s
′
n)
such that s′−j is smaller than or equal to s−j coordinate-wise, it holds that
d · (v(s′−j , sj + δ)− v(s′−j , sj)) ≥ v(s−j , sj + δ)− v(s−j , sj) (1)
If v satisfies this condition with d = 1, we say that v is an SOS valuation function.
14 Weak diminishing returns submodularity was introduced in [Soma and Yoshida, 2015], where it’s termed “di-
minishing returns submodularity”.
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Definition 2.14 (d-approximate strong submodular-over-signals valuations (d-strong-SOS valua-
tions)). The valuation function v(s) is a d strong-SOS valuation if for any j, δ ≥ 0,
s = (s1, . . . , sn) and s = (s
′
1, . . . , s
′
n)
such that s′ is smaller than or equal to s coordinate-wise, it holds that
d · (v(s′−j , s′j + δ)− v(s′−j , s′j)) ≥ v(s−j , sj + δ)− v(s−j , sj) (2)
If v satisfies this condition with d = 1, we say that i’s valuation functions are “strong-SOS”.
Definition 2.15 (SOS-valuations settings). We say that a mechanism design setting with in-
terdependent valuations is an SOS-valuations setting or, equivalently, that the agents have SOS-
valuations, in each of the following cases:
• Single parameter valuations (as in definition 2.1): for every i, the valuation function vi(s) is
SOS.
• Combinatorial valuations with single-parameter signals (as in definition 2.9): for every i and
T , the valuation function viT (s) is SOS;
• Combinatorial valuations with multi-parameter signals (as in definition 2.10): for every i and
T , viT (sT ) is SOS, where sT = (s1T , . . . , snT ).
Similar definitions can be given for d-SOS valuation settings and d-strong-SOS valuation settings.
Finally, in section 5, we will specialize to the case of separable SOS valuations.
Definition 2.16 (Separable SOS valuations). We say that a set of valuations as in Definition 2.10
are separable SOS valuations if for every agent i and subset T of items, viT (sT ) can be written as
viT (sT ) = g−iT (s−iT ) + hiT (siT ),
where g−iT (·) and hiT (·) are both weakly increasing and g−iT (s−iT ) is itself an SOS valuation
function.
Observation 2.2. A separable SOS valuation function is itself an SOS valuation function.
We can similarly define separable d-SOS valuations.
2.4 A useful fact about SOS valuations
Lemma 2.3. Let v : R+n → R+ be a d-SOS function. Let A ⊆ [n] and B = [n] \ A. For any
sA,yA ∈ R+|A|, and sB, s′B ∈ R+|B| such that sB is smaller than s′B coordinate wise,
d · (v(sA + yA, sB)− v(sA, sB)) ≥ v(sA + yA, s′B)− v(sA, s′B).
Proof. Let i1, i2, . . . , i|A| be the elements of A. For 1 ≤ j ≤ |A|, let sj and s′j denote the vectors
sj =
(
(si1 + yi1), . . . , (sij + yij ), sij+1 , . . . , si|A| , sB
)
,
s′j =
(
(si1 + yi1), . . . , (sij + yij ), sij+1 , . . . , si|A| , s
′
B
)
.
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Note that s|A| = (sA + yA, sB), and s′
|A| = (sA + yA, s′B).
It follows from the d-SOS definition that for every 1 ≤ j ≤ |A|,
d · (v(sj)− v(sj−1)) ≥ v(s′j)− v(s′j−1), (3)
where s0 = (sA, sB) and s
′0 = (sA, s′B).
Summing Equation (3) for j = 1, 2, . . . , |A| proves the claim.
3 The Key Lemma
The following is a key lemma which is used for both single parameter and combinatorial settings.
Lemma 3.1. Let vi : R+n → R+ be a d-SOS function. Let A be a uniformly random subset of
[n] \ {i}, and let B := ([n] \ {i}) \A. It now holds that
EA [vi(sA,0B, si)] ≥ 1
d+ 1
vi(s),
where the expectation is over the random choice of A.
Proof. We consider two equiprobable events,
• A = S ⊂ [n] \ {i} is chosen as the random subset.
• A = T = ([n] \ {i}) \ S is chosen as the random subset.
Normalize the valuations so that vi(s) = 1 and define α, β ∈ [0, 1] such that
vi(sS ,0T , si) = α, vi(0S , sT , si) = β.
It follows that
β = vi(0S , sT , si) ≥ vi(0S , sT , si)− vi(0S ,0T , si)
≥ (vi(sS , sT , si)− vi(sS ,0T , si))/d
= (1− α)/d,
where the first inequality follows from non-negativity of vi(0S ,0T , si), and the second inequality
follows from vi being d-SOS and Lemma 2.3.
Similarly, we have that
α ≥ (1− β)/d ⇒ β ≥ 1− αd;
It follows that
α+ β ≥ max
(
α+
1− α
d
, α+ 1− αd
)
.
Solving for equality of the two terms, we get that α = 1/(d+ 1) which implies that
α+ β ≥ 2
d+ 1
.
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Partition the event space into pairs (S, T ) that partition [n] \ {i}. For every such (S, T ) pair, it
follows that vi(sS ,0T , si) + vi(0S , sT , si) = α+ β ≥ 2d+1 .
We conclude with the following, where the third line follows from the fact that there are 2n−1/2
such (S, T ) pairs that partition [n] \ {i}:
EA
[
vi(s
A,0B, si)
]
=
∑
A⊆[n]\{i}
Pr[A] · vi(sA,0B, si)
=
1
2n−1
·
∑
A⊆[n]\{i}
vi(s
A,0B, si)
≥ 1
2n−1
· 2
n−1
2
· 2
d+ 1
=
1
d+ 1
,
as desired.
4 Single-Parameter Valuations
In this section we describe the Random Sampling Vickrey (RS-V) mechanism that achieves a
4-approximation for single-parameter downward-closed environments with SOS valuations and a
2(d + 1)-approximation for d-SOS valuations. We then give a lower bound of 2 and
√
d for SOS
and d-SOS valuations respectively, even in the case of selling a single item.
Let I ⊆ 2[n] be a downward-closed set system. We present a mechanism that serves only sets
in I and gets a 2(d+ 1)-approximation to the optimal welfare.
Random Sampling Vickrey (RS-V):
• Elicit bids s˜ from the agents.
• Partition the agents into two sets, A and B, uniformly at random.
• For i ∈ B, let wi = vi(˜sA, s˜i,0B\{i}).
• Allocate to a set of bidders in
argmaxS∈I : S⊆B
{∑
i∈S
wi.
}
Theorem 4.1. For agents with SOS valuations, and for every downward-closed feasibility constraint
I, RS-V is an ex-post IC-IR mechanism that gives 4-approximation to the optimal welfare. For d-
SOS valuations, the mechanism gives a 2(d+ 1)-approximation to the optimal welfare.
Proof. We first show the allocation is monotone in one’s signal, and hence, by Proposition 2.1, the
mechanism is ex-post IC-IR. Fix a random partition (A,B).
• Agents in A are never allocated anything and thus their allocation is weakly monotone in
their signal.
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• For an agent i ∈ B, increasing s˜i can only increase wi, whereas it leaves wj unchanged for
all j ∈ B \ {i}. Thus, this only increases the weight of feasible sets (subsets of B in I) that
i belongs to. Therefore, increasing si can only cause i to go from being unallocated to being
allocated.
For approximation, consider a set S∗ ∈ argmaxS∈I
∑
i∈S vi(s) that maximizes social welfare.
For every i ∈ S∗, from the Key Lemma 3.1, we have that
EB[wi · 1i∈B] = EB[vi(si, sA,0B−i) | i ∈ B] · Pr(i ∈ B) ≥
vi(s)
d+ 1
· 1
2
. (4)
For every set B, the fact that I is downward-closed implies that S∗ ∩B ∈ I. Therefore, S∗ ∩B
is eligible to be selected by RS-V as the allocated set of bidders. We have that the values of the
bidders we allocate to are at least
EB
[
max
S∈I:S⊆B
∑
i∈S
wi
]
≥ EB
[ ∑
i∈S∗∩B
wi
]
= EB
[∑
i∈S∗
wi · 1i∈B
]
=
∑
i∈S∗
EB [wi · 1i∈B] ≥
∑
i∈S∗
vi(s)
2(d+ 1)
,
as desired. Since the allocated bidders’ true values at s are only higher than the proxy values wi,
this continues to hold.
We note that for the case of downward-closed feasibility constraints, even if the valuations
satisfy single-crossing, there can be an n− 1 gap between the optimal welfare and the welfare that
the best deterministic mechanism can get. This is stated in Theorem B.1 in Section B.
The following lower bounds, Theorem 4.2 show that even for a single item setting, one cannot
hope to get a better approximation than 2 and Ω(
√
d) for SOS and d-SOS valuations respec-
tively.The lower bounds apply to arbitrary randomized mechanisms15.
Theorem 4.2. No ex-post IC-IR mechanism (not necessarily universal) for selling a single item
can get a better approximation than
(a) a factor of 2 for SOS valuations.
(b) a factor of Ω(
√
d) for d-SOS valuations.
Proof. Let xi(s) be the probability agent i is allocated at signal profile s. Notice that for every s,∑
i xi(s) ≤ 1, otherwise the allocation rule is not feasible.
(a) Consider the case where there are two agents, 1 and 2, s1 ∈ {0, 1} and agent 2 has no signal.
The valuations are v1(0) = 1, v1(1) = 1 + , v2(0) = 0 and v2(1) = H for H  1  . It is
easy to see the valuations are SOS.
In order to get better than a 2-approximation at s1 = 0, we must have x1(0) > 1/2. By
monotonicity, this forces x1(1) > 1/2 as well, and hence x2(1) < 1/2 by feasibility. This
15 A randomized mechanism takes as input the set of signals s and produces as output xi(s) and pi(s) for each
agent i, where xi(s) is the probability that agent i wins and pi(s) is agent i’s expected payment. Such a mechanism
is ex-post IC (but not necessarily universally so) if and only if xi(si, s−i) is monotonically increasing in si.
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implies that the expected welfare when s1 = 1 is x1(1)v1(1) + x2(1)v2(1) < H/2 + 1, while
the optimal welfare when s1 = 1 is H. For a large H, this approaches a 2-approximation.
Note that this lower bound applies even given a known prior distribution on the signals in
the event that we have a prior on the signals that satisfies: Pr[s1 = 0] · 1 = Pr[s1 = 1] ·H.
(b) Consider the case where there are n =
√
d agents and si ∈ {0, 1} for every agent i. The
valuation of agent i is
vi(s) =
{∑
j 6=i sj +  · si ∃j 6= i : sj = 0
d+  · si sj = 1 ∀j 6= i,
where → 0.
To see that the valuations are d-SOS, notice that whenever a signal sj changes from 0 to 1,
the valuation of agent i 6= j increases by 1 unless all other signals beside i’s are already set to
1, in which case the valuation increases by d−√d+ 2 < d. Consider valuation profiles si =
(0i,1−i). Note that by monotonicity, for every truthful mechanism, it must be the case that
xi(s
i) ≤ xi(1). Since any feasible allocation rule must satisfy
∑√d
i=1 xi(1) ≤ 1, then it must be
the case there exists some agent i such that xi(1) ≤ 1√d , which by monotonicity implies that
xi(s
i) ≤ 1√
d
. However, at profile si, vi(s
i) = d while vj(s
i) =
√
d− 2 < √d for all j 6= i, so we
get that the expected welfare of the mechanism at si is at most xi(s
i)·d+(1−xi(si))·
√
d ≤ 2√d,
while the optimal welfare is d. Again, the lower bound also applies to the setting with known
priors on the signals using a prior that satisfies: Pr[si] = Pr[sj] = 1√
d
for all i and j.
5 Combinatorial Auctions with Separable Valuations
In this section we present an ex-post IC-IR mechanism that gives 1/4 of the optimal social wel-
fare in any combinatorial auction setting with separable SOS valuations (as in Definition 2.16).
The mechanism, that we call the Random-sampling VCG auction is a natural extension of the
Random-Sampling Vickrey (RS-V) auction presented in Section 4. Note that unlike RS-V, here
we need to explicitly define payments so that the obtained mechanism is ex-post IC-IR. We de-
rive VCG-inspired payments which align the objective of the mechanism with that of the agents.
Separability is used here, as without it, the payment term would have been affected by the agent’s
report (while with separability, only the allocation is affected by it).
Random-Sampling VCG (RS-VCG):
• Agents report their signals s˜.
• Partition the agents into two sets A and B uniformly at random.
• For each agent j ∈ B and bundle T ⊆ [m], let
wjT := vjT (s˜jT , s˜AT ,0B−jT ) = g−jT (s˜AT ,0B−jT ) + hjT (s˜jT ).
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• Let the allocation be
{Ti}i∈B ∈ argmax{Si}i∈B
∑
i∈B
wiSi ;
i.e., {Ti}i∈B is the allocation that maximizes the “welfare” using wiT ’s.
• Set the payment for a winning agent i ∈ B receiving set of goods Ti to be:
pi(s˜) := g−iTi(s˜−iTi)− g−iTi(s˜ATi ,0B−iTi)−
∑
j∈B\{i}
wjTj + w−i,
where
w−i = max
partitions {T ′j}
∑
j∈B\{i}
wjT ′j ,
that is, w−i is the weight of the best allocation without agent i.
Since the wjT ’s do not depend on agent i’s report (since i is in B), w−i doesn’t depend on agent
i’s report. Therefore, we can (and will) ignore this term when considering incentive compatibility
below.
Note also that since the maximal partition guarantees that w−i ≥
∑
j∈B\{i}wjTj , and mono-
tonicity of valuations in signals guarantees that g−iTi(s˜−i) ≥ g−iTi(s˜A,0B−i). Therefore, the pay-
ments pi(s˜) are always nonnegative.
Theorem 5.1. Random-Sampling VCG is an ex-post IC-IR mechanism that gives a 4-approximation
to the optimal social welfare for any combinatorial auction setting with separable SOS valuations.
Proof. First we show that if the agents bid truthfully, then the mechanism gives a 4-approximation
to social welfare. For every agent i and bundle T ,
EB[wiT · 1i∈B] = EB[viT (siT , sAT ,0B−iT ) | i ∈ B] · Pr(i ∈ B) ≥
viT (sT )
2
· 1
2
, (5)
where the inequality follows by applying Lemma 3.1 with d = 1.
Let S∗1 , . . . , S∗n be the true welfare maximizing allocation. Then,
EB
[
max
partitions {Ti}
∑
i∈B
wiTi
]
≥ EB
[∑
i
wiS∗i · 1i∈B
]
=
∑
i
EB[wiS∗i · 1i∈B] ≥
1
4
∑
i
viS∗i (sS∗i ),
where the last inequality follows by substituting S∗i in T in Equation (5) for every i. Since viT (s)
is always at least wiT , this proves the approximation ratio.
Next, we show that RS-VCG is universally ex-post IC. Fix a random partition (A,B). Suppose
that when all agents bid truthfully
{T ∗j }j∈B = argmaxpartitions {Tj}
∑
j∈B
wjTj .
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Suppose that all agents but i ∈ B bid truthfully and i bids s′i instead of his true signal vector
si. Let {T ′j}j∈B be the resulting allocation. Therefore, agent i’s utility when reporting s′i (after
disregarding the w−i term as mentioned above) is:
viT ′i (s)− pi(s′i, s−i) = g−iT ′i (s−iT ′i ) + hiT ′i (siT ′i )− pi(s′i, s−i)
= g−iT ′i (s−iT ′i ) + hiT ′i (siT ′i )−
g−iT ′i (s−iT ′i )− g−iT ′i (sAT ′i ,0B−iT ′i )− ∑
j∈B\{i}
wjT ′j

= hiT ′i (siT ′i ) + g−iT ′i (sAT ′i ,0B−iT ′i ) +
∑
j∈B\{i}
wjT ′j
= wiT ′i +
∑
j∈B\{i}
wjT ′j =
∑
j∈B
wjT ′j
≤
∑
j∈B
wjT ∗j ,
where
∑
j∈B wjT ∗j is i’s utility for bidding truthfully.
Finally, we show that the mechanism is ex-post IR. Indeed, from above, agent i’s utility when
reporting truthfully (and without disregarding the w−i term) is
viT ∗i (sT ∗i )− pi(s) =
∑
j∈B
wjT ∗j − w−i =
∑
j∈B
wjT ∗j − maxpartitions {T ′j}
∑
j∈B\{i}
wjT ′j ≥ 0.
In the case of separable d-SOS valuations, the Random-Sampling VCG is an ex-post IC-IR mech-
anism that gives 2(d + 1)-approximation to the social welfare. The proof is identical to Theorem
5.1, except that Equation (5) is changed to
EB[wiT · 1i∈B] ≥ viT (sT )
2(d+ 1)
,
since we apply Lemma 3.1 with an arbitrary d.
Remark 5.2. Theorem 5.1 is clearly analogous to the VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions
with private values. As with VCG for private values, in many cases, there is unlikely to be a
polynomial time algorithm to compute allocations and payments. Exceptions include settings we
know and love such as unit-demand auctions, additive valuations, etc.
6 Combinatorial Auctions with Single-Dimensional Signals
In this section we consider combinatorial valuations (general combinatorial auctions) with single-
dimensional signals (as given by Definition 2.9).
When the signal space of each agent is of size at most k, we present a mechanism that gets
(k+3)-approximation for SOS valuations (see Section 6.1), and a mechanism that gets (2 log2 k+4)-
approximation for strong-SOS valuations (Definition 2.14, see Section 6.2 for details regarding the
mechanism). For d-SOS and d-strong-SOS valuations, the mechanism generalizes to give O(dk)-
and O(d2 log k)-approximations respectively, as shown in Section C.
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We first decompose the optimal welfare into two parts, OTHER and SELF. Each part will be
covered by a corresponding mechanism. Let T ∗ = {T ∗i }i∈[n] be a welfare-maximizing allocation at
signal profile s, and let W ∗(s) be the social welfare of T ∗ at s. Consider the following decomposition:
W ∗(s) =
∑
i
viT ∗i (s)
=
∑
i
viT ∗i (s−i, 0i) +
∑
i : si>0
(
viT ∗i (s)− viT ∗i (s−i, 0i)
)
≤
∑
i
viT ∗i (s−i, 0i) +
∑
i : si>0
(
viT ∗i (0−i, si)− viT ∗i (0)
)
(6)
≤
∑
i
viT ∗i (s−i, 0i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
OTHER
+
k−1∑
`=1
∑
i : si=`
viT ∗i (0−i, si)︸ ︷︷ ︸
SELF
, (7)
where Equation (6) follows from the definition of submodularity (and therefore, also follows the
definition of strong-submodularity). The last inequality follows from the non-negativity of viT ∗i (0).
The first term in the decomposition represents the contribution of others’ signals to one’s value
from his allocated bundle, while the second term represents one’s contribution to his own value.
Each of these terms will be targeted using a different mechanism. Whereas the OTHER term will
be targeted using the same mechanism in both the SOS and strong-SOS cases, the SELF term will
be treated differently.
6.1 (k + 3)-approximation for SOS valuations
Suppose si ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} for all i. The mechanism is as follows:
Mechanism k signals High-Low (k-HL):
With probability pRT =
k−1
k+3 , run Random Threshold; otherwise, run Random Sampling, as de-
scribed below:
Mechanism Random Threshold
• Choose a random threshold ` uniformly in {1, . . . , k − 1}.
• Let N≥` = {i : si ≥ `} be the “high” agents; i.e., agents with signal at least `, and let
N<` = [n] \N≥` be the “low” agents.
• For every high agent i ∈ N≥` and bundle T , let v¯iT := viT (sN<` , `N≥`)
• For every low agent i ∈ N<` and bundle T , let v¯iT := 0.
• Let the allocation be
T¯ ∈ argmaxS={Si}i∈N≥`
∑
i∈N≥`
v¯iSi .
(i.e., the allocation that maximizes the “welfare” of high agents using values v¯iT .)
• Agent i that receives bundle T¯i pays viT¯i(s−i, si = `− 1).
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Mechanism Random Sampling
• Split the agents into sets A and B uniformly at random.
• For each i ∈ B and bundle T , let v˜iT := vij(sA,0B).
• For each i ∈ A and bundle T , let v˜iT := 0.
• Let the allocation be
T˜ ∈ argmaxS={Si}i∈B
∑
i∈B
v˜iSi .
(i.e., the allocation that maximizes the “welfare” of agents in B using values v˜iT .)
• Charge no payments.
The k-HL mechanism is a random combination of two mechanisms: Random Threshold approx-
imates the welfare contribution of the bidders’ signals to their own value (the SELF term); Random
Sampling approximates the welfare contributions of the bidders’ signals to other bidders’ values
(the OTHER term). We wish to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1. For every combinatorial auction setting with SOS valuations, single-dimensional
signals, and signal space of size k, i.e. si ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k−1} ∀i, mechanism k-HL is an ex-post IC-IR
mechanism that gives (k + 3)-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
We first argue that the mechanism is ex-post IC-IR.
Proof of ex-post IC-IR. Random Sampling is ex-post IC-IR since the agents that might receive
items (agents in B) cannot change the allocation since their signals are ignored (and they pay
nothing).
As for Random Threshold, consider a threshold ` chosen by the mechanism. If the agent’s
signal is below ` and the agent reports ` or above, then his payment, if allocated bundle T is
viT (s−i, si = `−1) ≥ viT (s); i.e., the agent’s utility is non-positive. Bidding a different value below
` will grant the agent no items. If his value is ` or above, then bidding a different signal above `
will result in the same outcome, since the sets N≥` and N<` remain the same. If he bids a signal
below `, then he won’t receive any item, and his utility will be 0, while bidding his true signal will
result in non-negative utility.
In Lemma 6.3, we prove that Random Sampling covers the OTHER component of the social
welfare, and in Lemma 6.2, we show that Random Threshold covers the SELF component.
Lemma 6.2. For SOS valuations, the Random Threshold mechanism gives a (k−1)-approximation
to the SELF component of the optimal social welfare.
Proof. Consider a threshold ` ∈ {1, . . . , k−1} chosen in Random Threshold. Whenever ` is chosen,
we have that ∑
i : si=`
v¯iT ∗i =
∑
i : si=`
viT ∗i (sN<` , `N≥`) ≥
∑
i : si=`
viT ∗i (0−i, si).
Since Random Threshold chooses an allocation T¯ = {T¯i}i∈N≥` that maximizes the welfare under
v¯iT ’s, the value of the allocation is only larger than the left expression above. Because viT¯i(s) ≥ v¯iT¯i ,
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we get that if ` was chosen, which happens with probability 1k−1 , the welfare achieved is at least∑
i : si=`
viT ∗i (0−i, si). Therefore, the welfare from running Random Threshold is at least
k−1∑
`=1
1
k − 1
∑
i : si=`
viT ∗i (0−i, si),≥
SELF
k − 1 .
Lemma 6.3. For SOS valuations, the Random Sampling mechanism gives a 4-approximation to
the OTHER component of the optimal social welfare.
Proof. Consider a set T . Using an application of the Key Lemma 3.1 with respect to viT (s−i, 0i),
we see that
EA,B[v˜iT ] ≥ Pr[i ∈ B] · EA,B[v˜iT | i ∈ B] = 1
2
EA,B\i[v˜iT | i ∈ B] ≥
1
4
viT (s−i, 0i). (8)
Therefore, the expected weight of the allocation {T ∗i }i∈[n] using weights v˜iT ’s is
EA,B
[∑
i
v˜iT ∗i
]
=
∑
i
EA,B
[
v˜iT ∗i
]
≥
∑
i
1
4
viT ∗i (s−i, 0i) =
OTHER
4
.
Since the mechanism chooses the optimal allocation according to the v˜iT ’s, its weight can only be
larger. Moreover, since v˜iT = viT (s−i, 0) ≤ viT (s), the welfare achieved by the mechanism is at
least OTHER4 , as desired.
We conclude by proving the claimed approximation ratio.
Proof of approximation. According to Lemma 6.2, Random Threshold approximates SELF to a
factor of k − 1. According to Lemma 6.3 that Random Sampling approximates OTHER to a factor
of 4. Therefore, running Random Threshold with probability pRT and Random Sampling with
probability 1− pRT yields a welfare of
pRT
SELF
k − 1 + (1− pRT )
OTHER
4
=
k − 1
k + 3
· SELF
k − 1 +
4
k + 3
· OTHER
4
=
SELF+ OTHER
k + 3
≥ W
∗(s)
k + 3
,
where the inequality follows Equation (7).
6.2 O(log k)-Approximation with Strong-SOS Valuations
Strong-SOS valuations means the effect on the valuation is concave in one’s own signal. This allows
us to use a bucketing technique in order to give an O(log k)-approximation to the SELF component
in the decomposition depicted by Equation (7).
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Consider the SELF term in Equation (7). We can bound this term as follows:
SELF =
k−1∑
`=1
∑
i : si=`
viT ∗i (0−i, si)
=
log2 k∑
`=1
∑
i : 2`−1≤si<2`
viT ∗i (0−i, si)
≤
log2 k∑
`=1
∑
i : 2`−1≤si<2`
viT ∗i (0−i, 2
`−1
i), (9)
where the inequality follows the definition of strong-SOS valuations.
We introduce mechanism Random Bucket to give an O(log k)-approximation to the upper bound
in Equation (9).
Mechanism Random Bucket:
• choose ` uniformly in {1, . . . , log2 k}.
• Let NB` = {i : such that si ≥ 2`−1} be the agents with signal at least 2`−1 and N¬B` =
[n] \NB` .
• For i ∈ NB` and bundle T , let v¯iT := viT (sN¬B` ,2`−1NB` ) (and v¯iT := 0 for i ∈ N¬B`).
• Let the allocation be
T¯ ∈ argmaxS={Si}i∈NB`
∑
i∈NB`
v¯iSi .
(i.e., the allocation that maximizes the “welfare” of high agents using values v¯iT .)
• Agent i that receives bundle T¯i pays viT¯i(s−i, si = 2`−1 − 1).
We show the following approximation guarantee regarding Random Bucket.
Lemma 6.4. For strong-SOS valuations, the Random Bucket mechanism is ex-post IC-IR and gives
a 2 log2 k approximation to the SELF component of the optimal social welfare.
Proof. The proof of ex-post IC-IR is identical to that of mechanism Random Threshold, as both
are threshold-based mechanisms. The proof of the approximation guarantee is also very similar to
that of Random Threshold.
Consider a threshold 2`−1 for ` ∈ {1, . . . , k−1} chosen in Random Bucket. Whenever ` is chosen,
we have that∑
i : 2`−1≤si<2`
v¯iT ∗i =
∑
i : 2`−1≤si<2`
viT ∗i (sN¬B` ,2
`−1
NB`
) ≥
∑
i : 2`−1≤si<2`
viT ∗i (0−i, 2
`−1
i).
Since Random Bucket chooses an allocation that maximizes the v¯iT ’s, the value of the allocation
is only larger. Because viT¯i(s) ≥ v¯iT¯i , we get that if ` was chosen, which happens with probability
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1
log2 k
, the welfare achieved is at least
∑
i : 2`−1≤si<2`
viT ∗i (0−i, si). Therefore, the welfare from running
Random Bucket is at least
log2 k∑
`=1
1
log2 k
∑
i : 2`−1≤si<2`
viT ∗i (0−i, si),≥
SELF
2 log2 k
.
Mechanism k-signals Strong-SOS (k-SS) runs Random Bucket with probability pRB =
log2k
log2k+2
and mechanism Random Sampling with probability 1− pRB.
Theorem 6.5. For every combinatorial auction with single-dimensional signals with strong-SOS
valuations and signal space of size k, i.e. si ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k−1} ∀i, mechanism k-SS is ex-post IC-IR,
and gives (2 log2 k + 4)-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
Proof. We already established that both Random Bucket and Random Sampling are ex-post IC-
IR, hence k-SS is ex-post IC-IR as well. As for the approximation, according to Lemma 6.4,
with probability pRB we get 2 log2 k-approximation to SELF, and according to Lemma 6.3, with
probability 1− pRB we get a 4-approximation to OTHER. Overall, the expected welfare is at least
pRB
SELF
2 log2 k
+ (1− pRB)OTHER
4
=
SELF+ OTHER
2 log2 k + 4
≥ W
∗
2 log2 k + 4
,
as desired.
7 Open Problems
Our analysis and results suggest many open problems:
• For combinatorial auctions with multi-dimensional signals: is separability a necessary condi-
tion for achieving constant approximation to welfare? This problem is open even for single-
dimensional signals, and even for “simple” combinatorial valuations, such as unit-demand.
• For single-parameter SOS valuations, downward closed feasibility, and single-dimensional sig-
nals, closing the gap between 1/4 and 1/2 is open.
• The exact same gap applies for combinatorial, separable-SOS valuations with multi-dimensional
signals.
• How does the distinction between SOS and strong-SOS affect the problems above, if at all?
• When considering the relaxation of SOS valuations to d-SOS valuations, there is a gap between
the positive and negative results with respect to the dependence on d.
23
More generally, what other classes of valuations give rise to approximately efficient mechanisms in
settings with interdependent valuations?
Acknowledgements We gratefully thank an anonymous referee who pointed out that many of
the proofs in this paper, hold, with minor adjustments, for subadditive over signals valuations.
Surprisingly, submodular over signals valuations are not a special case of subadditive over signals
valuations. However, strong submodular over signals valuations are so. The actual situation is
rather subtle and we will address this issue in a subsequent version of this paper.
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A Unit-Demand Valuations with Single-Crossing
Whereas single-crossing is a strong enough condition to implement the fully efficient mechanism
in a variety of single-parameter environments, generalizations of this condition fail even in the
simplest multi-parameter environments. We consider the case where bidders are unit demand and
each bidder has a scalar as a signal. We define single-crossing for this setting as follows.
Definition A.1 (Single-crossing for unit-demand valuations). A valuation profile v is said to be
single crossing if for every agent i, signals s−i, item j and agent `,
∂
∂si
vij(s−i, si) ≥ ∂
∂si
v`j(s−i, si). (10)
In this section, we show that in the case two non-identical items are for sale, and the valuations
are unit demand and satisfy single-crossing as defined in Equation (10), any truthful mechanism is
bounded away from achieving full efficiency.
In order to give the lower bound, we first give a characterization of ex-post IC and IR mecha-
nisms in multi-dimensional environments in interdependent values settings (Section A.1). We then
turn to prove the lower bound (Section A.2).
A.1 Cycle Monotonicity
In the IPV model, Rochet [1987] introduced cycle monotonicity as a necessary and sufficient con-
dition on the allocation to be implementable in dominant strategies (DSIC) for multidimensional
environments. It was noticed that a straightforward analogue holds for the IDV value model, for
ex-post implementability (EPIC) (in Vohra [2007], this fact is stated without a proof).
Fix a feasible allocation rule x = {xi}i∈[n], where xiT (s) is the probability agent i receives a
bundle T under bid profile s. For each agent i, consider the graph Gxi where there is a vertex for
each signal profile s, and there is a directed edge from s to t if s−i = t−i. The weight of edge (s, t)
is
w(s, t) = ET∼xi(s)[viT (s)]− ET∼xi(t)[viT (s)] =
∑
T⊆[m]
xiT (s)viT (s)−
∑
T⊆[m]
xiT (t)viT (s).
The following theorem states that a necessary and sufficient condition for ex-post implementabil-
ity of x is that for every agent i, every directed cycle in Gxi is non-negative. The proof is a straight-
forward adjustment of the original proof in Rochet [1987], and is given below for completeness.
Theorem A.1. The allocation rule x is implementable by an ex-post IC mechanism if and only if
for every agent i, all directed cycles in Gxi have non-negative weight.
Proof. We first show that if the allocation rule is implementable, then there are no negative cycles.
Fix some payment rule p = {pi}i∈[n], where pi(s) is the payment of agent i under bid profile s. Let
s−i be the real signals of all bidders except i, and consider a cycle s1 → s2 → . . .→ s` → s1 in Gxi ,
where st = (s−i, si = ζt) for t ∈ [`]. Since (x,p) is an ex-post IC mechanism, for every true signal
si = s, agent i is at least as well off bidding s than any other bid s
′. We get that
ET∼xi(s1)[viT (s
1)]− pi(s1) ≥ ET∼xi(s2)[viT (s1)]− pi(s2)
...
ET∼xi(s`−1)[viT (s
`−1)]− pi(s`−1) ≥ ET∼xi(s`)[viT (s`−1)]− pi(s`)
ET∼xi(s`)[viT (s
`)]− pi(s`) ≥ ET∼xi(s1)[viT (s`)]− pi(s1)
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Summing over the above inequalities and using the convention that `+ 1 = 1, we get that
∑`
j=1
ET∼xi(sj)[viT (s
j)]−
∑`
j=1
pi(s
j) ≥
∑`
j=1
ET∼xi(sj+1)[viT (s
j)]−
∑`
j=1
pi(s
j)
⇐⇒
∑`
j=1
(
ET∼xi(sj)[viT (s
j)]− ET∼xi(sj+1)[viT (sj)]
) ≥ 0,
where the LHS of the last inequality is exactly the weight of the cycle.
We now show how to compute payments that implement a given allocation rule x that induces
no negative cycles for any i and Gxi . Given G
x
i , one can compute payments as follows.
• Add a dummy node d with edges of weight 0 to all nodes in Gxi .
• For every node s of Gxi , let δ(s) be the distance of the shortest path from d to s.
• Set pi(s) = −δ(s).
Fix signals of the other players s−i. Let s be player i’s true signal and s′ be some other possible
signal for i. Denote s = (s−i, s) and s′ = (s−i, s′). Consider the nodes s and s′ in Gxi . Since δ(s
′)
is the length of the shortest path from d, it must be that
δ(s′) ≤ δ(s) + w(s, s′),
where w(s, s′) is the weight of the edge from s to s′. Substituting w(s, s′) = ET∼xi(s)[viT (s)] −
ET∼xi(s′)[viT (s)], pi(s) = −δ(s), and pi(s′) = −δ(s′), we get
ET∼xi(s)[viT (s)]− pi(s) ≥ ET∼xi(s′)[viT (s)]− pi(s′),
as desired.
A.2 Lower Bounds for Deterministic and Randomized Mechanisms
Lemma A.2. There exists a setting with two items and two agents with unit-demand and single
crossing valuations, such that no deterministic truthful mechanism achieves more than 1/2 of the
optimal welfare.
Figure 1: An instance with unit-demand single-crossing valuations where no deterministic truthful
allocation achieves more than a half of the optimal welfare.
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Proof. Consider the setting depicted in Figure 1, with two agents, 1 and 2, and two items, a and
b. s1 ∈ {0, 1} and s2 is fixed. The values at s1 = 0 are
v1a(0) = 1, v1b(0) = 0, v2a(0) = 0, v1b(0) = 1,
and at s1 = 1 are
v1a(1) = 1 +H + , v1b(1) = H, v2a(1) = H, v1b(1) = 1,
for some arbitrarily large H and a sufficiently small . One can easily verify that the valuations sat-
isfy Equation (10), and hence single crossing; indeed, when agent 1’s signal increases, the valuation
of agent 1 for each one of the item increases by more than the change in agent 2’s valuation.
We show that no deterministic truthful mechanism can get better than 2-approximation. In
order to get better than 2-approximation, the mechanism must allocate item a to agent 1 and item
b to bidder 2 at signal s1 = 0. At s1 = 1, allocating item b to agent 1 and item a to agent 2 obtains
a welfare of 2H, while any other allocation obtains at most a welfare of H + 2 + . Since H can be
arbitrarily large, one must allocate item b to agent 1 and item a to agent 2 at signal s1 = 1 in order
to get an approximation ratio better than 2. Consider such an allocation rule x, and the graph Gx1 .
This graph has one cycle, with one edge from s1 = 0 to s1 = 1 and one edge from s1 = 1 to s1 = 0.
The weight of this cycle is
(v1a(0)− v1b(0)) + (v1b(1)− v1a(1)) = (1− 0) + (H − (H + 1 + )) = − < 0.
Based on Theorem A.1, this implies that this allocation rule is not implementable
Figure 2: An instance with unit-demand single-crossing valuations where no randomized truthful
allocation achieves more than
√
2+2
4 of the optimal welfare.
Lemma A.3. There exists a setting with two items and two agents with unit-demand and single
crossing valuations, such that no randomized truthful mechanism achieves more than
√
2+2
4 of the
optimal welfare.
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Proof. Consider the setting depicted in Figure 2, with two agents, 1 and 2, and two items, a and
b. s1 ∈ {0, 1} and s2 ∈ {0, 1}. The values are
v1a(0, 0) = 1, v1b(0, 0) = 0, v2a(0, 0) = 0, v1b(0, 0) = 1,
v1a(1, 0) = 1 +
√
2H, v1b(1, 0) = H, v2a(1, 0) = H, v1b(1, 0) = 1,
v1a(0, 1) = 1, v1b(0, 1) = H, v2a(0, 1) = H, v2b(0, 1) = 1 +
√
2H,
v1a(1, 1) = 1 +
√
2H, v1b(1, 1) = H, v2a(1, 1) = H, v2b(1, 1) = 1 +
√
2H,
for an arbitrarily large H. One can easily verify that the valuations are single crossing. We claim
that the following equalities hold with respect to the allocation rule of the optimal randomized
mechanism:
(a) For every s1, s2, x1a(s1, s2) = x2b(s2, s1) and x2a(s1, s2) = x1b(s2, s1).
(b) For some q ∈ [0, 1], x1a(0, 0) = x2b(0, 0) = q and x1∅(0, 0) = x2∅(0, 0) = 1− q.
(c) For some p ∈ [0, 1], x1a(0, 1) = p and x1b(0, 1) = 1− p.
We next prove the above equalities.
(a) Consider some implementable allocation rule x¯, and consider the allocation rule x˜ where
x˜1a(s1, s2) = x¯2b(s2, s1) and x˜2a(s1, s2) = x¯1b(s2, s1) for every s1, s2. Note that the valuations
are symmetric; i.e., the role of item a (resp. b) for agent 1 is the same as the role of items
b (resp. a) for agent 2. By symmetry, x¯ is implementable if and only if x˜ is implementable,
and both allocation rules have the same approximation guarantee. Clearly, an allocation
rule x that applies allocation rules x¯ and x˜, with probability 12 each, maintains the same
approximation guarantee. Moreover, this allocation rule satisfies the desired property.
(b) The optimal mechanism gains nothing from assigning any positive probability for allocating
item b to agent 1 under signal profile (0, 0). This is because item b grants no value to
agent 1, and in terms of incentives, it can only incentivize agent 1 to misreport his signal
at signal profile (1, 0). Analogously, the optimal mechanism gains nothing from assigning
any positive probability for allocating item a to agent 2 under signal profile (0, 0). By (a),
x1a(0, 0) = x2b(0, 0) = q for some q ∈ [0, 1]. To conclude the proof of (b), note that the only
other feasible set for the agents is the empty set (otherwise, agent 1 has some probability to
get item b and agent 2 has some probability to get item a).
(c) Consider Gx1 and the cycle C = (0, 0) → (1, 0) → (0, 0) in Gx1 . This is the only cycle that
contains the node (1, 0) in Gx1 . Assume x1∅(1, 0) > 0. Transferring z ∈ (0, 1] probability from
x1∅(1, 0) to x1a(1, 0) decreases the weight of the edge (0, 0) → (1, 0) by z, and increases the
weight of the edge (1, 0)→ (0, 0) by z(1 +√2H) > z. Therefore, its net effect on the weight
of C is positive. Transferring z ∈ (0, 1] probability from x1∅(1, 0) to x1b(1, 0) does not affect
the weight of the edge (0, 0)→ (1, 0), and increases the weight of the edge (1, 0)→ (0, 0) by
zH. Therefore, its net effect on the weight of C is positive. Since transferring x1∅(1, 0) to
x1a(1, 0) and x1b(1, 0) increases welfare and does not violate cycle monotonicity, the optimal
mechanism clearly assigns no probability to x1∅(1, 0).
Now assume x1{a,b}(1, 0) > 0. By Moving this probability to x1a(1, 0), we get the same
expected welfare at (1, 0), and the weight of the edges in C does not change. Therefore, we
may also assume the mechanism does not assign positive utility to x1{a,b}(1, 0).
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According to Theorem A.1, in any truthful mechanism, the weight of the cycle C must be
non-negative . This translates to the following condition.(
ET∼x1(0,0)[v1T (0, 0)]− ET∼x1(1,0)[v1T (0, 0)]
)− (ET∼x1(1,0)[v1T (1, 0)]− ET∼x1(0,0)[v1T (1, 0)])
= (q − p) +
(
p(1 +
√
2H) + (1− p)H − q(1 +
√
2H)
)
≥ 0
⇒ q ≤ p
(
1− 1√
2
)
+
1√
2
.
In the optimal mechanism, q will be as large as possible in order to maximize the expected welfare
at signal profile (0, 0). Hence, we can assume q = p
(
1− 1√
2
)
+ 1√
2
. Therefore, the approximation
ratio at profile (0, 0) is at most q = p
(
1− 1√
2
)
+ 1√
2
. At profile (0, 1), if item a is allocated to agent 1
(which happens with probability p), the welfare of the mechanism is at most 2 +
√
2H, while the
welfare of the optimal allocation is 2H. AsH can be arbitrarily large, this approximation ratio tends
to 1√
2
. Therefore, the approximation ratio at profile (1, 0) is at most p√
2
+(1−p) = 1−p
(
1− 1√
2
)
.
The optimal mechanism would balance between the approximation ratio at (0, 0) and at (1, 0),
therefore uses p that solves
p
(
1− 1√
2
)
+
1√
2
= 1− p
(
1− 1√
2
)
.
Solving for p, we get p = 12 . This leads to an approximation ratio of at most
2+
√
2
4 , as promised.
B n− 1 Lower Bound for Deterministic Mechanisms with Single-
Crossing SOS Valuations.
We show that for downward-closed environments, even if valuations satisfy a single-crossing con-
dition and are SOS, any deterministic mechanism cannot obtain a better approximation to the
optimal welfare than n− 1.
Theorem B.1. There exists a downward-closed environment with valuations that satisfy single-
crossing for which no deterministic mechanism more than a n− 1 fraction of the optimal welfare.
Proof. Consider a set of n bidders, where I = {1} ∪ P ({2, . . . , n}), where P ({2, . . . , n}) is the
power set of the set {2, . . . , n}. Only agent 1 has a signal s1 ∈ {0, 1}, and other players do not have
signals. The valuations are:
v1(0) = 1 v1(1) = 1 +H
vi(0) = 0 vi(1) = H ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , n}
for an arbitrary large value H  1. Once can easily verify these valuations satisfy single-crossing
and SOS.
Any deterministic mechanism that wants to get any approximation to the social welfare must
allocate to agent 1 when s1 = 0. In addition, if a deterministic mechanism wants to get a better
approximation than n− 1 to the optimal social welfare, agent 1 cannot be allocated when s1 = 1.
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Otherwise, none of the bidders in {2, . . . n} can get allocated because the only set in I that contains
agent 1 is the singleton set. Therefore, if agent 1 is allocated at s1 = 1, the achieved welfare is
1 + H, whereas the optimal welfare is (n − 1) ·H (when serving all agents in {2, . . . , n}). For an
arbitrary large H This ratio approaches n− 1.
The proof follows since serving agent 1 at s1 = 0 and not serving agent 1 at s1 = 1 is violates
monotonicity.
Remark B.2. The n−1 factor is tight for single-crossing valuations. If [n] ∈ I, then the mechanism
can always allocate all agents. Otherwise, one can always allocate only to the highest valued agent,
which is monotone because of single crossing. Since the largest feasible set is of size at most n− 1
in this case, allocating to the highest valued agent yields an approximation ratio of n− 1.
C Results for d-SOS
We now extend the results in Section 6 to the case of combinatorial d-SOS and combinatorial
d-strong-SOS valuations with single-dimensional signals. We first note that if we consider d-SOS
valuations, then Equation (6) in the decomposition becomes
W ∗ ≤
∑
i
viT ∗i (s−i, 0i) +
∑
i : si>0
d · (viT ∗i (0−i, si)− viT ∗i (0))
≤
∑
i
viT ∗i (s−i, 0i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
OTHER
+
k−1∑
`=1
∑
i : si=`
d · viT ∗i (0−i, si)︸ ︷︷ ︸
SELF
, (11)
We now show the extension of Theorem 6.1 to d-SOS valuations.
Theorem C.1. For every combinatorial auction with d-SOS valuations over single-dimensional
signals, and signal space of size k, i.e., si ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} ∀i, there exists a truthful mechanism
that gives d(k + 1) + 2-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
Proof. The mechanism is identical to k-HL, but runs (Random Threshold) with probability pRT =
(k−1)d
d(k+1)+2 and (Random Sampling) With probability 1 − pRT . The mechanism was already proved
to be truthful in Section 6.1.
Random Threshold now gives a d(k − 1)-approximation to the new SELF term. The proof is
the same as of Lemma 6.2, but the extra factor of d comes from the fact the the new SELF term is
d times larger.
Random Sampling gives a 2(d+ 1)-approximation to the OTHER term. While this term is the
same for d-SOS, the new factor is due to the fact that when applying Lemma 3.1 in the proof of
Lemma 6.3, we get that EA,B[v˜iT ] ≥ 12(d+1)viT (s−i, 0i) instead of the bound we get in Equation (8).
The new approximation guarantee follows from the new decomposition, the new approxima-
tion guarantees the various mechanisms get for the terms of the decomposition, and the updated
probability pRT .
We next extend Theorem 6.5.
Theorem C.2. For every combinatorial auction with d-strong-SOS valuations over single-dimensional
signals, and signal space of size k, i.e., si ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} ∀i, there exists a truthful mechanism
that gives (d(d+ 1) log2 k + 2(d+ 1))-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
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Proof. The mechanism is identical to mechanism k-SS from Section 6.2, but runs Random Bucket
with probability pRB =
d log2 k
d log2 k+2
and (Random Sampling) With probability 1− pRB.
The SELF term from Equation (9) is now bounded via the following:
SELF =
k−1∑
`=1
∑
i : si=`
d · viT ∗i (0−i, si)
=
log2 k∑
`=1
∑
i : 2`−1≤si<2`
d · viT ∗i (0−i, si)
≤
log2 k∑
`=1
∑
i : 2`−1≤si<2`
d(d+ 1) · viT ∗i (0−i, 2`−1i), (12)
where the inequality follows the definition of d-strong-SOS valuations.
The new bound changes the guarantee of Random Bucket to get a d(d+1) log2 k-approximation
to the SELF term, where the proof is identical to that of Lemma 6.4.
As stated in Theorem C.1, Random Sampling approximates the OTHER term to a factor 2(d+1).
The proof of the new bound follows the new decomposition, the updated probabilities and the new
approximation guarantees of the mechanisms being run.
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